Facts:
The plaintiffs, who are the sons of Smt. Premi and heirs to Sham Singh, the original owner of the disputed plots, received a gift in 1935 from Smt. Malan, the widow of Sham Singh. This gift was equally divided between the plaintiffs and Smt. Khemi, the younger sister of Smt. Premi. Subsequently, Smt. Khemi made a gift back to the plaintiffs before her demise in 1944. The suit, initially initiated in 1941, was halted until May 29, 1946, under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, providing an advantage to the plaintiffs. Alleging unlawful possession by the defendants post the High Court’s decision on November 23, 1958, the plaintiffs filed a possession suit. The defendants contended that they acquired complete possession of the land after Smt. Khemi’s death in 1944, claiming open, continuous, exclusive ownership adverse to others, asserting that the plaintiffs’ suit was time-barred. The appellants sought possession, but the defendants countered, citing the bar of limitation and acquisition of title through adverse possession exceeding 12 years. The first appellate court opined that due to the ongoing case, those opposed to the decision couldn’t assert their rights. The High Court agreed that individuals already residing on the land possessed rights, stating that even though the other party attempted to take over later, they were precluded as their attempt commenced during the pendency of the first case. Despite the subsequent failure of their attempt, the rights of the existing residents persisted. Consequently, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue Involved:
The central issue is whether the doctrine of lis pendens as stipulated in Section 52 of the TPA halts the running period of limitation during the pendency of the defendants’ suit filed in 1940 and ultimately decided in 1958.
Observations:
The Court noted that the purpose of limitation laws is to prevent the disturbance or deprivation of rights acquired through long enjoyment or lost due to a party’s inaction, negligence, or laches. Emphasizing that Section 52 of the TPA does not explicitly exclude the period spent in litigation from computation, the Court indicated that the exclusion of time in computing limitation periods is a distinct topic addressed in Part III of the Limitation Act. The Court outlined conditions for the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, including the plaintiff’s diligent prosecution of civil proceedings founded upon the same cause of action. In the present case, the cause of action arose after the previous suit’s decision, with the cause of action in the previous suit being entirely different. Regarding the doctrine of lis pendens, the Court underscored its objective to subject parties and others seeking rights in immovable property to the court’s power, preventing the defeat of the pending action’s purpose. The Court referred to the case of Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami and Ors. [1973] 1 SCR 139, defining lis pendens as the jurisdiction, power, or control acquired by a court over property involved in a pending suit until final judgment.
Conclusion:
The Court ultimately declined to apply the doctrine of lis pendens in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963.